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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 134

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 24/12/1997

Where it occurred: Kabul Darwaza, Ward
3, Kandahar city
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan
Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: building rubble
residential/urban

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)
standing to excavate (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
use of shovel (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The
following summarises its content.
Both victims had been deminers for seven years and had attended a revision course three
months before the accident. It was 22 days since their last leave. On the day of the accident
they were working in a "collapsed residential" area. A photograph showed the accident site
50cm from a high wall on land littered with loose earth and rubble.
The investigators determined that Victim No.1 was investigating a pile of spoil deposited by
the back-hoe when he got a continuous detector reading and started excavating with a long
handled shovel. He detonated a mine. The mine was identified as a PMN (by "found
fragments").
A photograph of a damaged shovel (handle and head separated) was included in the report.
The Team Leader said the deminer was excavating a reading with a shovel and used it at the
incorrect angle. He said the pick should be allowed for prodding.
The Section Leader said that the deminer was working properly but must have applied too
much pressure on the shovel.
The Team Leader said the deminer was excavating a reading with a shovel and used it at the
incorrect angle. He said the pick should be allowed for prodding.
The Section Leader said that the deminer was working properly but must have applied too
much pressure on the shovel.
The victim's partner (Victim No.2) said he was 5-6 metres from the deminer when the
accident occurred and he did not know why it had happened.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the deminer ignored technical procedures when
investigating a reading, the deminer's partner ignored safety distance requirements, and that
the command group failed to exercise effective control.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that deminers should wear helmet and frag-jacket when
investigating the spoil from a back-hoe, that deminers must maintain safety distances, and
that the Section Leader should be warned for poor performance. [The recommendation to
wear frag-jackets is interpreted as a request for body protection.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 170

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: none

Thin, short visor
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Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hearing
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
Victim No.1's injuries were summarised as: injuries to ears [a sketch indicated injury to both
ears, which were bleeding]
Letters to the insurers indicated that the victim was moderately deafened and off work until 9th
January 1998. He also suffered depression.
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.

Victim Report
Victim number: 171

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: medic

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Eye
minor Face
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
Victim's No.2’s injuries were summarised as abrasions to the head [a sketch indicated a
single abrasion on the right temporal lobe].
Letters to the insurers indicated that the victim was a nurse and that he sustained an injury to
his left eye [not mentioned before] and did not mention the head injury.
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because, from the
investigator's recommendations, it is inferred that visors were not worn when the accident
occurred. This indicates a failure of supervision. The close proximity of Victim No.2 to the
blast is not explained and indicates a further failure of field supervision as recognised by the
investigators.
It is possible that the visors provided were too damaged to see through properly (as was seen
frequently during 1998), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment may
represent a serious management failing.
It is clear from the statements of field supervisors that they considered the use of a shovel to
excavate was “correct” procedure. This implies failing of training or communication among
management levels.
The use of the shovel and an upright position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those
requirements. The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for
local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.

4

